1 00:00:01,900 --> 00:00:02,900 Oh. 2 00:00:33,300 --> 00:00:37,440 I'm John Oliver. Thank you so much for joining us. It has been a busy week. 3 00:00:37,660 --> 00:00:41,440 Zelensky and Netanyahu met with Trump. We saw the incredible headline, Cash 4 00:00:41,440 --> 00:00:45,940 Patel loses lawsuit against man who called him googly-eyed chud, which I 5 00:00:45,940 --> 00:00:48,340 think means that's his legal name now. 6 00:00:48,900 --> 00:00:50,220 And this happened. 7 00:00:50,780 --> 00:00:55,060 The chase for the squirrel is on and the squirrel is in the corner and the 8 00:00:55,060 --> 00:00:58,140 squirrel is still eluding an entire horde of grounds crew members. 9 00:00:58,360 --> 00:01:03,240 And the squirrel is free once again. Hemmed in. No, I won't be hemmed in. I 10 00:01:03,240 --> 00:01:08,420 have freedom on my mind. Trying to go between the legs and eventually he gets 11 00:01:08,420 --> 00:01:13,740 away again and hops through the towel and hops through another towel. 12 00:01:14,590 --> 00:01:18,330 Okay, I think from now on, every baseball game should probably just be a 13 00:01:18,330 --> 00:01:20,710 bunch of adults trying to trap a squirrel with a towel. 14 00:01:21,190 --> 00:01:24,690 And credit to that announcer for narrating that like it was the Odyssey. 15 00:01:25,030 --> 00:01:29,110 It takes vision to see a squirrel evading a ground screw and to shout, I 16 00:01:29,110 --> 00:01:30,690 have freedom on my mind! 17 00:01:31,770 --> 00:01:34,670 Sadly, that squirrel was eventually caught, but by the top of the eighth 18 00:01:34,670 --> 00:01:38,510 inning, the Tigers mascot was holding up a sign saying, Free the squirrel! 19 00:01:39,390 --> 00:01:40,390 Which is... 20 00:01:40,460 --> 00:01:44,120 Excellent. And it's a sign that we might actually have to borrow soon if Bucky's 21 00:01:44,120 --> 00:01:45,140 comes for our Mr. 22 00:01:45,520 --> 00:01:46,458 Nutterbutter merch. 23 00:01:46,460 --> 00:01:49,260 Still available, by the way, until it legally isn't. 24 00:01:49,600 --> 00:01:52,960 Meanwhile, America's cyclospora outbreak continued to spread. 25 00:01:53,560 --> 00:01:59,080 The CDC says four more states, Illinois, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, are 26 00:01:59,080 --> 00:02:03,580 linked to that spike in cyclosporiasis cases across a total of nine states 27 00:02:03,580 --> 00:02:08,440 caused by shredded iceberg lettuce sourced by Taylor Farms. Nearly 2,000 28 00:02:08,440 --> 00:02:12,140 people in those states got sick after eating the lettuce at Taco Bell, which 29 00:02:12,140 --> 00:02:13,800 has removed all affected products. 30 00:02:14,350 --> 00:02:18,030 But that is just a fraction of the record-breaking nearly 12,000 potential 31 00:02:18,030 --> 00:02:22,230 cases of this parasite nationwide, and that number is expected to go up. So if 32 00:02:22,230 --> 00:02:25,030 you're eating at a restaurant, it is recommended you ask the source of their 33 00:02:25,030 --> 00:02:27,570 lettuce, or you eat cooked vegetables instead for now. 34 00:02:27,790 --> 00:02:31,490 Yeah, the best advice we have for you right now is to basically play lettuce 35 00:02:31,490 --> 00:02:33,330 detective at every restaurant. 36 00:02:34,330 --> 00:02:39,190 really expecting them to say, oh shit, we actually get it from Sam's Parasite 37 00:02:39,190 --> 00:02:43,350 Barn. We were hoping no one would ask. Because let's be honest, your server 38 00:02:43,350 --> 00:02:46,150 doesn't know where the restaurant sources their lettuce. 39 00:02:46,570 --> 00:02:49,890 Their main concern is that the bartender they fucked last week stopped working 40 00:02:49,890 --> 00:02:54,070 Monday, and their manager won't release next month's schedule unless everyone 41 00:02:54,070 --> 00:02:58,030 goes to a poetry night. So why not give them all a break and just order soup? 42 00:02:58,390 --> 00:03:02,230 Now, if you haven't got cyclosporiasis, the symptoms... 43 00:03:02,490 --> 00:03:04,490 are unpleasant to say the least. 44 00:03:04,970 --> 00:03:10,470 It gives you, and I'm sorry to have to say this, debilitating explosive 45 00:03:10,470 --> 00:03:15,530 diarrhea that can last for weeks. I wasn't feeling well. The pain in my 46 00:03:15,530 --> 00:03:18,230 stomach was, like, unbearable. Immediately had to spread to the 47 00:03:18,230 --> 00:03:19,670 bathroom. It was horrible. 48 00:03:20,090 --> 00:03:23,070 The people saying, oh, I want to get the parasite, I want to lose weight. 49 00:03:23,590 --> 00:03:27,070 No, you don't. Yeah, of course you don't. 50 00:03:27,320 --> 00:03:30,560 Nobody should be looking at the people who pooped so weird that they made it 51 00:03:30,560 --> 00:03:34,320 onto the news and think, should have been me. 52 00:03:35,020 --> 00:03:38,820 An epidemiologist even described the symptoms as, it's uncontrollable and 53 00:03:38,820 --> 00:03:41,700 it's very liquid. If you've seen pictures from cholera wars where the 54 00:03:41,700 --> 00:03:45,020 patients are on gurneys and the gurney has a hole where your butt goes and 55 00:03:45,020 --> 00:03:49,320 there's a bucket underneath the hole, it's very similar. And no offence, but I 56 00:03:49,320 --> 00:03:52,640 don't think that epidemiologist should be allowed to give statements anymore. 57 00:03:54,030 --> 00:03:57,230 We were looking for something like, it'll cause digestive issues. Not, Taco 58 00:03:57,230 --> 00:04:01,830 Bell made American shit so hard and wet, they need assless beds like a 19th 59 00:04:01,830 --> 00:04:02,830 century poop wall. 60 00:04:03,850 --> 00:04:08,270 It is no wonder Taco Bell's business briefly dropped by nearly a third, and 61 00:04:08,270 --> 00:04:11,530 the company has gone out of its way to try and reassure people. 62 00:04:12,090 --> 00:04:15,670 We actually have a statement from Taco Bell that they put out not long ago 63 00:04:15,670 --> 00:04:20,610 saying, we want you to hear it from us. We take your health and safety seriously 64 00:04:20,610 --> 00:04:24,850 and have removed all affected Taylor Farms lettuce from Taco Bell stores. 65 00:04:25,110 --> 00:04:28,290 So go ahead and enjoy your Taco Bell today. 66 00:04:28,510 --> 00:04:32,390 You always got us. We always got you. See you in the drive through. 67 00:04:32,670 --> 00:04:34,570 No, you fucking won't. 68 00:04:36,570 --> 00:04:40,670 Truly no more efficient way to say that there is a nationwide diarrhoea epidemic 69 00:04:40,670 --> 00:04:43,530 than the phrase, we have a statement from Taco Bell. 70 00:04:44,010 --> 00:04:47,850 Because it's never going to be good news. It's never going to be, we have a 71 00:04:47,850 --> 00:04:50,750 statement from Taco Bell. They found Amelia Earhart. 72 00:04:51,270 --> 00:04:56,030 She's 129 and she's housing a crunch wrap. She just lost track of time. 73 00:04:57,100 --> 00:05:00,820 But it's not just a notes app non-apology. To win customers back, Taco 74 00:05:00,820 --> 00:05:04,860 Bell's even been offering $1 deals for certain menu items that don't contain 75 00:05:04,860 --> 00:05:08,940 any lettuce, like this encharito, which looks like a murdered burrito dying in a 76 00:05:08,940 --> 00:05:09,940 pool of its own blood. 77 00:05:10,440 --> 00:05:14,320 And this Mexican pizza, which looks like a plate of nachos that studied abroad in 78 00:05:14,320 --> 00:05:17,680 Rome for six months and now calls itself pizza. And look. 79 00:05:18,190 --> 00:05:22,010 I will give Taco Bell credit for one thing. They proactively addressed this 80 00:05:22,010 --> 00:05:25,770 problem. And to be fair, cyclospora is hard to track. And as we've talked about 81 00:05:25,770 --> 00:05:28,950 before, the FDA has been underfunded for decades now. 82 00:05:29,190 --> 00:05:32,930 But this second Trump administration has somehow managed to make a bad situation 83 00:05:32,930 --> 00:05:34,950 significantly worse. 84 00:05:35,330 --> 00:05:41,190 In President Trump's second term, the FDA has lost about 20% of its staff. 85 00:05:41,410 --> 00:05:46,990 The CDC is down 25%. The CDC used to have 11 scientists. 86 00:05:47,530 --> 00:05:48,870 tracking food parasites. 87 00:05:49,310 --> 00:05:50,450 Now it's three. 88 00:05:50,770 --> 00:05:53,170 Wait, only three people now? 89 00:05:53,450 --> 00:05:57,450 That is clearly not enough. It really feels like we shouldn't be able to fit 90 00:05:57,450 --> 00:06:02,370 the CDC's entire parasite tracking team comfortably onto a porch glider. 91 00:06:03,010 --> 00:06:07,890 Look, as we have said before, a good public health system is one you don't 92 00:06:07,890 --> 00:06:10,510 notice. A bad one makes headlines. 93 00:06:11,050 --> 00:06:15,250 And boy, are we seeing that right now. And meanwhile, Secretary of Health and 94 00:06:15,250 --> 00:06:20,910 Human Services, Robert Kennedy, or as his friends call him, has tried to 95 00:06:20,910 --> 00:06:24,670 reassure people. But just the day after he claimed the cyclospora outbreak was 96 00:06:24,670 --> 00:06:28,810 under control, the FDA announced it was investigating a new outbreak with cases 97 00:06:28,810 --> 00:06:29,850 only growing since. 98 00:06:30,210 --> 00:06:33,590 And look, clearly, none of this is ideal. And it does say something pretty 99 00:06:33,590 --> 00:06:37,050 grim about America, that when it comes to acting swiftly... 100 00:06:37,370 --> 00:06:40,670 to prevent a public health threat, the current government just lost the moral 101 00:06:40,670 --> 00:06:42,590 high ground to fucking Taco Bell. 102 00:06:43,290 --> 00:06:47,330 They seem to be in the mood to make amends to their customers right now. We 103 00:06:47,330 --> 00:06:49,710 figured the very least that we could do is help them out. 104 00:06:50,790 --> 00:06:51,790 Hey, America. 105 00:06:51,830 --> 00:06:56,670 We at Taco Bell want you to know we care about your health and safety. 106 00:06:57,070 --> 00:07:02,070 That's right. The inventors of fiery Doritos Locos Tacos care about your 107 00:07:02,070 --> 00:07:05,910 physical well-being. So we're here to say we're sorry. 108 00:07:06,460 --> 00:07:11,400 We're going to live con trito, which is how our chihuahua would say sorry if he 109 00:07:11,400 --> 00:07:13,500 hadn't have died rushing the cockpit on 9-11. 110 00:07:14,660 --> 00:07:19,660 We know that because of our food, many of you have been shitting your brains 111 00:07:19,660 --> 00:07:21,980 out in a way that we never intended. 112 00:07:22,280 --> 00:07:25,820 Because Taco Bell's always prided itself on two things. 113 00:07:26,380 --> 00:07:31,380 Having the wettest food in America and only giving you the regular, normal 114 00:07:31,380 --> 00:07:32,380 level of diarrhea. 115 00:07:32,420 --> 00:07:36,860 That's why we temporarily removed lettuce from our food. So while you're 116 00:07:36,860 --> 00:07:40,680 powering through our Mexican food-adjacent menu, including our, oh, 117 00:07:40,720 --> 00:07:44,540 Jesus Christ, sausage, crunchwrap, supreme, you can feel confident that 118 00:07:44,540 --> 00:07:48,800 you're avoiding one narrow definition of gastrointestinal disease. Again, we're 119 00:07:48,800 --> 00:07:52,220 not promising you won't get regular diarrhea from this. 120 00:07:52,730 --> 00:07:54,630 I mean, you've seen our food, right? 121 00:07:54,950 --> 00:07:58,650 There's something on the menu called Diablo Dusted Chicken Nugget. 122 00:07:58,850 --> 00:08:00,630 Okay? We're just saying. 123 00:08:00,990 --> 00:08:04,730 We'll try not to give you the kind of diarrhea that'll put you on the news. 124 00:08:04,970 --> 00:08:08,930 And if that's not enough, then frankly, that's on you, big guy, for eating 125 00:08:08,930 --> 00:08:13,230 something called the Beastie Potato Loaded Griller. And you expected not to 126 00:08:13,230 --> 00:08:14,230 shit your pants? 127 00:08:14,710 --> 00:08:15,710 Taco Bell. 128 00:08:15,790 --> 00:08:18,430 Where else are you going to go when you're drunk? Fucking Wendy? 129 00:08:18,790 --> 00:08:20,010 Get the fuck out of here. 130 00:08:21,740 --> 00:08:22,740 Moving on. 131 00:08:23,240 --> 00:08:25,720 Our main story tonight concerns surveillance. 132 00:08:25,940 --> 00:08:28,520 You know, the thing that this pervert does all year long. 133 00:08:28,760 --> 00:08:31,940 He sees you when you're sleeping. He knows when you're jacking it to the 134 00:08:31,940 --> 00:08:32,940 gilded age. 135 00:08:33,419 --> 00:08:36,820 Specifically, we're going to look at police surveillance technology. It takes 136 00:08:36,820 --> 00:08:40,380 many forms, from cameras to facial recognition to even this. 137 00:08:40,780 --> 00:08:44,260 The robot itself was given the name HP RoboCop. 138 00:08:44,510 --> 00:08:45,690 for Huntington Park. 139 00:08:45,950 --> 00:08:51,250 It's, you know, rather a futuristic piece of equipment that essentially is a 140 00:08:51,250 --> 00:08:55,330 sophisticated, current-time, high-definition camera system. 141 00:08:55,570 --> 00:09:01,050 Please help keep the park clean. So initially, there was some negative sort 142 00:09:01,050 --> 00:09:02,350 of reaction to the robot. 143 00:09:02,570 --> 00:09:04,770 The robot was vandalized and it was tipped over. 144 00:09:05,050 --> 00:09:08,550 Yeah, of course it was, because look at it. 145 00:09:08,750 --> 00:09:12,210 It's a glorified Roomba that knocks. And did you hear its voice? 146 00:09:12,890 --> 00:09:16,090 I don't think it was possible to create a dweebier robot than this virgin, but 147 00:09:16,090 --> 00:09:18,690 enter stage left, the police egg. 148 00:09:19,230 --> 00:09:22,170 It's got the body of a weeble and the voice of a hall monitor, and it's okay 149 00:09:22,170 --> 00:09:24,190 for me to say that because... same. 150 00:09:25,150 --> 00:09:26,150 The police... 151 00:09:26,350 --> 00:09:30,490 Love using surveillance tech. And in recent years, the prevalence of local 152 00:09:30,490 --> 00:09:34,230 mass surveillance systems has exploded thanks to cheaper technology and 153 00:09:34,230 --> 00:09:36,690 increased funding from the federal government. And this all tends to get 154 00:09:36,690 --> 00:09:39,250 presented as a boon to public safety. 155 00:09:39,450 --> 00:09:43,570 Local news loves to cover cities' real-time crime centres. Here's a story 156 00:09:43,570 --> 00:09:45,930 about one in Las Vegas. Here is one in Detroit. 157 00:09:46,150 --> 00:09:49,930 And here's one in Cooper City, Florida. And in that story, the town's then-mayor 158 00:09:49,930 --> 00:09:51,810 offered this upbeat assessment. 159 00:09:52,719 --> 00:09:54,000 Everyone is being watched. 160 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:56,980 And if you're doing nothing wrong, it doesn't matter what you're doing. 161 00:09:57,240 --> 00:10:01,520 But when you're doing something wrong, we're going to find out. We're going to 162 00:10:01,520 --> 00:10:05,380 have the wherewithal to come and get you. We've got essentially Big Brother 163 00:10:05,380 --> 00:10:06,380 on steroids. 164 00:10:06,820 --> 00:10:07,820 Okay. 165 00:10:07,960 --> 00:10:11,380 I'm not sure that's quite the spell he seems to think it is. 166 00:10:11,580 --> 00:10:15,760 For one thing, Big Brother is pretty famously not the hero of 1984. 167 00:10:17,520 --> 00:10:20,640 But the truth is, a lot of the technologies that feed into those 168 00:10:20,640 --> 00:10:24,380 centres have significant problems, from civil liberties issues to the way that 169 00:10:24,380 --> 00:10:27,180 more recently they've been weaponised to target immigrants. And it feels like 170 00:10:27,180 --> 00:10:30,820 we're now at a point where there needs to be much more awareness of what is 171 00:10:30,820 --> 00:10:34,240 actually out there. So given that, tonight, we thought we'd do something a 172 00:10:34,240 --> 00:10:37,640 bit different and try to give you a field guide for some of the most common 173 00:10:37,640 --> 00:10:41,180 surveillance tools, specifically cameras, microphones, licence plate 174 00:10:41,180 --> 00:10:44,880 readers, cell site simulators, and the practice of predictive policing that 175 00:10:44,880 --> 00:10:48,630 combines all of them to make that big... Big brother on steroids line, true in 176 00:10:48,630 --> 00:10:50,150 all the worst ways. 177 00:10:50,470 --> 00:10:53,530 And let's start with cameras. You've undoubtedly seen police surveillance 178 00:10:53,530 --> 00:10:57,810 cameras all over the place, and the case for them is pretty simple. Here is a 179 00:10:57,810 --> 00:11:02,070 police officer in New Orleans where cops have access to over 2,000 cameras 180 00:11:02,070 --> 00:11:03,250 pitching the upside. 181 00:11:03,770 --> 00:11:07,810 We had a shooting at this very intersection at 4.30 in the morning of 182 00:11:07,810 --> 00:11:09,870 the gentleman that got shot, claimed to be the victim. 183 00:11:10,370 --> 00:11:13,550 We watched the video surveillance, went back, and it showed that actually he was 184 00:11:13,550 --> 00:11:14,810 actually shooting at the young man. 185 00:11:15,550 --> 00:11:20,230 first so it kind of you know helped us exonerate the guy we were looking for 186 00:11:20,230 --> 00:11:24,870 and if you didn't have the camera do you think you would have known the truth no 187 00:11:24,870 --> 00:11:30,670 absolutely not really because if that's true that sounds less like an argument 188 00:11:30,670 --> 00:11:35,390 for cameras than it is an argument against you because you basically just 189 00:11:35,390 --> 00:11:38,510 admitted that we couldn't do dick all until we got them video doodads 190 00:11:39,260 --> 00:11:42,620 But the thing is, police don't just use cameras to find evidence of something 191 00:11:42,620 --> 00:11:43,599 that happened. 192 00:11:43,600 --> 00:11:46,640 They can also use them to fish for crime that they think might. 193 00:11:47,050 --> 00:11:50,830 essentially using them as a digital form of stop and frisk. Staying in New 194 00:11:50,830 --> 00:11:53,910 Orleans, take the case of Michael Celestine, who police there accosted 195 00:11:53,910 --> 00:11:56,350 after they watched him walking around in a puffy jacket. 196 00:11:56,590 --> 00:12:01,050 You can see them zoom the camera in on him and track his movements for 15 197 00:12:01,050 --> 00:12:04,590 minutes. And their justification for doing that is that they claim he had a 198 00:12:04,590 --> 00:12:08,090 suspicious bulge in his jacket, which is already a weird thing to be on the 199 00:12:08,090 --> 00:12:11,530 lookout for in a state which allows for concealed carry. But an even weirder 200 00:12:11,530 --> 00:12:15,570 thing to do in the whole idea behind puffer jackets is that they bulge. It is 201 00:12:15,570 --> 00:12:17,720 quite literal. the puff part. 202 00:12:18,580 --> 00:12:22,360 Puffer jackets are essentially fashion bubble wrap. Babes, read a Vogue. 203 00:12:23,140 --> 00:12:27,180 The police ultimately chased and then arrested and tased Celestine before 204 00:12:27,180 --> 00:12:31,160 finding a weapon in his pants leg, only for the DA to ultimately drop all 205 00:12:31,160 --> 00:12:34,860 charges. But because he happened to be out on parole, he wasn't allowed to make 206 00:12:34,860 --> 00:12:37,420 bail and had to sit in jail for a year. 207 00:12:37,720 --> 00:12:41,440 And it's worth noting that police aren't just limited to using their own 208 00:12:41,440 --> 00:12:42,440 surveillance cameras. 209 00:12:42,620 --> 00:12:45,800 Increasingly, they're able to use those owned by private businesses or 210 00:12:45,800 --> 00:12:51,340 homeowners. There are an estimated 85 million in this country, and police now 211 00:12:51,340 --> 00:12:54,880 routinely request access to them. In fact, here's an ad from one company that 212 00:12:54,880 --> 00:12:58,880 facilitates that, Fusus, explaining to businesses how it works. 213 00:12:59,240 --> 00:13:03,680 Setting up Fusus is fast, requires minimal hardware, and has no activation 214 00:13:03,680 --> 00:13:08,200 fees. In an investigation, police can automatically request footage from all 215 00:13:08,200 --> 00:13:10,300 nearby businesses at the click of a button. 216 00:13:11,150 --> 00:13:16,130 And camera owners can securely share recorded as well as live video feeds to 217 00:13:16,130 --> 00:13:17,130 aid in the investigation. 218 00:13:17,450 --> 00:13:22,070 Yeah, it's that easy. With the click of a button, police can get access to hours 219 00:13:22,070 --> 00:13:23,730 of private security footage. Look. 220 00:13:24,340 --> 00:13:27,080 Technology has made a lot of things easy to do with a click of a button, like 221 00:13:27,080 --> 00:13:31,020 order medicine, pay bills, or buy this inexplicable wall decal of a senior 222 00:13:31,020 --> 00:13:34,940 woman with asthma, or one of that same woman wielding a frying pan as a weapon, 223 00:13:35,000 --> 00:13:36,440 or a decal of Dr. 224 00:13:36,680 --> 00:13:40,720 Phil as an MandM. Add all three to your cart, and now you've got a home worthy 225 00:13:40,720 --> 00:13:41,900 of architectural digest. 226 00:13:42,500 --> 00:13:43,640 Technology is amazing. 227 00:13:44,360 --> 00:13:48,340 But it does feel like turning on the panopticon should be a bit harder than 228 00:13:48,340 --> 00:13:52,220 that. And it doesn't stop there. Houston has gone so far as developing technology 229 00:13:52,220 --> 00:13:57,140 that allows Amazon's ring doorbell to live stream straight to police crime 230 00:13:57,140 --> 00:14:00,620 centres, which is a pretty wild use of something that I mainly associate with 231 00:14:00,620 --> 00:14:03,160 bringing us videos of animals who just want to come inside. 232 00:14:03,880 --> 00:14:07,560 Just for a minute, it's cold out here and you've got treats in there. 233 00:14:08,830 --> 00:14:12,810 And while some businesses or homeowners might want to do that, in other places, 234 00:14:12,870 --> 00:14:14,550 they're not given much of a choice. 235 00:14:15,070 --> 00:14:19,570 Rialto, California, has made starting a business contingent on signing up with 236 00:14:19,570 --> 00:14:23,630 Fusus, with permits containing language like, the security cameras shall be 237 00:14:23,630 --> 00:14:28,210 accessible to the Rialto Police Department through Fusus. And come on! 238 00:14:28,970 --> 00:14:33,590 Opening a small business is already hard enough. There's cash flow issues, hiring 239 00:14:33,590 --> 00:14:36,730 and firing, and of course, dealing with Yelp reviews that say, woman at the 240 00:14:36,730 --> 00:14:39,290 front desk had a weird eye, scared my son, he is nine! 241 00:14:40,950 --> 00:14:44,910 But now, you also have to decide if opening your nail salon is worth being a 242 00:14:44,910 --> 00:14:46,410 knock on passers-by. 243 00:14:46,910 --> 00:14:50,490 But it's not just cameras being dotted all over the place, it's also 244 00:14:50,490 --> 00:14:53,630 microphones, like the ones operated by a company called Shot... 245 00:14:54,300 --> 00:14:58,300 It's used in over 200 jurisdictions. The way ShotSpotter works is it basically 246 00:14:58,300 --> 00:15:02,860 sets up microphones all over a city which alert police if they sense a loud 247 00:15:02,860 --> 00:15:06,960 noise that could be a gunshot. And some places treat ShotSpotter as highly 248 00:15:06,960 --> 00:15:11,300 reliable. In Houston, their department doesn't dispatch officers for all 911 249 00:15:11,300 --> 00:15:15,440 calls about gunfire, but they treat every ShotSpotter alert as a top 250 00:15:15,440 --> 00:15:19,460 priority report. One officer even said no matter what other call you're on, if 251 00:15:19,460 --> 00:15:21,640 a ShotSpotter alert drops, you go. 252 00:15:22,490 --> 00:15:27,650 Unfortunately, the technology seems nowhere near as good as you'd want it to 253 00:15:27,650 --> 00:15:28,790 be for that kind of response. 254 00:15:29,110 --> 00:15:33,070 An AP investigation found the systems can miss live gunfire right under its 255 00:15:33,070 --> 00:15:37,330 microphones or misclassify the sounds of fireworks as gunshots, while other 256 00:15:37,330 --> 00:15:40,510 reportings found shots spotted being activated by cars backfiring or even 257 00:15:40,510 --> 00:15:43,690 people using a nail gun, which is not good. 258 00:15:43,970 --> 00:15:49,130 You don't want hyped-up cops showing up weapons-drawn because Dad finally got 259 00:15:49,130 --> 00:15:50,890 around to putting up the Christmas lights. 260 00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:55,080 And there have been cases of people searched and arrested for things like 261 00:15:55,080 --> 00:15:59,060 drug possession simply because ShotSpotter sent police to their 262 00:15:59,060 --> 00:16:02,280 location. So its inaccuracy can cause real problems. 263 00:16:02,480 --> 00:16:07,400 And the evidence it actually prevents crime is scant. In fact, when a local 264 00:16:07,400 --> 00:16:10,840 news team in Minneapolis looked into nearly two years' worth of results from 265 00:16:10,840 --> 00:16:13,740 its ShotSpotter system, the results were dire. 266 00:16:14,460 --> 00:16:18,980 The data reveals during that time, MPD responded to shot spotter activations 267 00:16:18,980 --> 00:16:21,420 roughly 8,500 times. 268 00:16:21,760 --> 00:16:27,440 The data also shows about 80% of the time, officers documented no evidence of 269 00:16:27,440 --> 00:16:32,480 a gun-related crime. And only 32 activations total led to an arrest. 270 00:16:32,760 --> 00:16:35,340 That's less than 1% of the time. 271 00:16:35,640 --> 00:16:38,840 That percentage there is, that's insane. 272 00:16:39,120 --> 00:16:40,120 That's crazy. 273 00:16:40,500 --> 00:16:41,500 He's right. 274 00:16:42,200 --> 00:16:45,580 It is crazy. And while this is not the point, I do think that man should be 275 00:16:45,580 --> 00:16:47,940 asked to comment on literally every news story. 276 00:16:48,540 --> 00:16:51,820 Speaker of the House Mike Johnson and his son monitor each other's porn 277 00:16:51,820 --> 00:16:53,640 intake. That's crazy. 278 00:16:54,000 --> 00:16:55,000 It is. 279 00:16:55,560 --> 00:16:59,660 Reba McEntire partnered with 40 farms to make corn mazes out of her face. 280 00:17:00,140 --> 00:17:01,140 That's crazy. 281 00:17:01,380 --> 00:17:02,380 I agree. 282 00:17:02,460 --> 00:17:06,060 Half a million Italians seek exorcisms every year. 283 00:17:06,380 --> 00:17:09,700 That percentage there is... That's insane. 284 00:17:10,119 --> 00:17:11,119 That's crazy. 285 00:17:11,829 --> 00:17:12,990 My thoughts exactly. 286 00:17:13,589 --> 00:17:18,690 The point is, it sure seems like a technology this flawed shouldn't be 287 00:17:18,690 --> 00:17:22,589 dispatching police all over a city. And there is a similar issue with our next 288 00:17:22,589 --> 00:17:26,849 technology, automated license plate readers, or ALPRs. You've probably seen 289 00:17:26,849 --> 00:17:30,750 them by the side of the road. And cops will claim that they're a way to find 290 00:17:30,750 --> 00:17:33,490 stolen cars or those engaged in suspicious activity. 291 00:17:33,750 --> 00:17:37,450 The most popular are made by a company called Flop. And here is how they work. 292 00:17:38,000 --> 00:17:43,500 Flock license plate readers don't just scan tags looking for stolen cars or 293 00:17:43,500 --> 00:17:45,060 vehicles on a hot list. 294 00:17:45,260 --> 00:17:49,700 The cameras take a photo of every car that passes, stamped with the precise 295 00:17:49,700 --> 00:17:50,860 time and location. 296 00:17:51,180 --> 00:17:55,580 The more cameras you pass, the clearer the picture of your movement. All of 297 00:17:55,580 --> 00:18:00,640 that data is saved in a database for 30 days, shared with connected police 298 00:18:00,640 --> 00:18:06,050 departments. Allowing the government to go back in time to see where your car 299 00:18:06,050 --> 00:18:11,850 was and when. No warrant required, whether you're suspected of a crime or 300 00:18:11,850 --> 00:18:17,090 not. Okay, first, the Oscar for cinematography goes to that news piece. 301 00:18:17,450 --> 00:18:21,330 Drone shots, drive-in talks, and a license plate close-up that'll make 302 00:18:21,330 --> 00:18:22,890 Tarantino buff both nuts? 303 00:18:23,410 --> 00:18:26,230 Call the Academy, the race is officially over. 304 00:18:26,470 --> 00:18:27,990 The point is, though... 305 00:18:28,220 --> 00:18:33,120 ALPRs will send up a lot of alerts, but unfortunately, many are false alarms. 306 00:18:33,540 --> 00:18:37,920 A randomized trial in Vallejo, California, found that 37% of all ALPR 307 00:18:37,920 --> 00:18:43,260 hits from fixed readers, like those attached to a streetlight, and 35% from 308 00:18:43,260 --> 00:18:48,370 mobile ALPRs, like those on cop cars, were misreads, which is an astonishingly 309 00:18:48,370 --> 00:18:51,030 high error rate, and that has had real consequences. 310 00:18:51,490 --> 00:18:56,010 Drivers have been repeatedly pulled over because a reader read the numbers on 311 00:18:56,010 --> 00:18:58,730 their plates wrong and tagged the vehicles as stolen. 312 00:18:58,930 --> 00:19:03,150 And some of those incidents have been truly hideous, like this one, where the 313 00:19:03,150 --> 00:19:07,050 police wrongly assumed that a car full of children was stolen. I'll warn you, 314 00:19:07,110 --> 00:19:08,250 this is hard to watch. 315 00:19:09,490 --> 00:19:10,490 There's kids. 316 00:19:10,650 --> 00:19:13,930 It's these cries and screams, Brittany Gilliam. 317 00:19:14,400 --> 00:19:16,260 can't bring herself to relive. 318 00:19:17,580 --> 00:19:18,580 That's terrifying. 319 00:19:18,780 --> 00:19:20,600 As a parent, that's heartbreaking. 320 00:19:21,040 --> 00:19:24,720 Gilliam says she was searching for an open nail salon while sitting in a 321 00:19:24,720 --> 00:19:27,260 parking lot on Bucklet and Eyelift in Aurora. 322 00:19:27,600 --> 00:19:30,120 And she's screaming like, hey, hey, auntie, the police. 323 00:19:30,320 --> 00:19:32,060 When officers pulled up from behind. 324 00:19:32,500 --> 00:19:35,400 They got their guns on us. They got their guns on us. Gilliam was in the SUV 325 00:19:35,400 --> 00:19:36,960 with her six-year-old daughter. 326 00:19:37,450 --> 00:19:43,710 12-year-old sister and two nieces, one 14, the other 17 years old. Police say a 327 00:19:43,710 --> 00:19:47,270 license plate reader alerted them the SUV was stolen. 328 00:19:47,750 --> 00:19:51,630 Yeah, that is obviously terrible. And you already know that the police fucked 329 00:19:51,630 --> 00:19:55,950 up there. But I promise you are not ready for just how dumb that fuck up 330 00:19:55,950 --> 00:20:01,450 was. It turns out the stolen vehicle was actually a motorcycle, not Gilliam's 331 00:20:01,450 --> 00:20:05,670 SUV. Both vehicles share the plate number, but they were from different 332 00:20:05,670 --> 00:20:06,890 states. Yeah. 333 00:20:07,290 --> 00:20:09,610 It was a motorcycle from another state. 334 00:20:10,030 --> 00:20:13,970 And the only thing that could be further from an SUV in Colorado would be if the 335 00:20:13,970 --> 00:20:16,350 license actually belonged to a horse in Tennessee. 336 00:20:17,250 --> 00:20:21,010 And look, so far, I've been focusing on when police technology gets stuff 337 00:20:21,010 --> 00:20:24,490 actively wrong. But it is worth remembering, even when these systems 338 00:20:24,490 --> 00:20:27,810 work perfectly, they can still be wildly invasive. 339 00:20:28,250 --> 00:20:30,710 Cameras and license plate readers can track your movements. 340 00:20:31,020 --> 00:20:34,820 wherever you go, which means they could find out if you, say, attended a protest 341 00:20:34,820 --> 00:20:36,980 or visited an abortion clinic. 342 00:20:37,300 --> 00:20:40,920 What's more, some companies like Flock make a feature out of the fact that 343 00:20:40,920 --> 00:20:44,860 their databases can be accessed by not just your local police, but also by 344 00:20:44,860 --> 00:20:48,180 those from other towns. And on top of all that, the federal government, 345 00:20:48,420 --> 00:20:52,440 meaning agencies like ICE and Border Patrol, has been known to use this 346 00:20:52,440 --> 00:20:56,300 network. Flock used to make arrangements with them to do so directly, but has 347 00:20:56,300 --> 00:20:58,320 since discontinued that, though... 348 00:20:58,700 --> 00:21:02,340 the government is still able to use the network through local law enforcement. 349 00:21:02,580 --> 00:21:06,080 And while all of that is already comfortably bad enough, other 350 00:21:06,080 --> 00:21:10,440 technologies can be even more invasive. Take cell site simulators. They are 351 00:21:10,440 --> 00:21:13,920 devices with names like Stingray, and they allow cops to basically snoop on 352 00:21:13,920 --> 00:21:16,000 any phone that is near them. 353 00:21:16,480 --> 00:21:21,160 Here's how it works. Cell phones are always trying to connect to nearby cell 354 00:21:21,160 --> 00:21:26,400 towers. A stingray acts like a cell tower decoy. In what's called a man-in 355 00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:30,120 -the-middle attack, it tricks cell phones into thinking it's the nearest 356 00:21:30,120 --> 00:21:34,900 cell tower, phones connect to the stingray, and police can access a range 357 00:21:34,900 --> 00:21:36,040 of personal information. 358 00:21:36,380 --> 00:21:39,060 But they don't just get intel on one phone. 359 00:21:39,610 --> 00:21:43,450 Every phone nearby is forced to divert to the stingray. 360 00:21:43,830 --> 00:21:45,930 Calls are passed on to a real cell tower. 361 00:21:46,310 --> 00:21:48,770 Data scooped up stays with police. 362 00:21:49,190 --> 00:21:53,730 Yeah, not great, right? I don't want a decoy cell tower getting any of my cell 363 00:21:53,730 --> 00:21:57,410 phone data because what you do on your cell phone is your most personal of 364 00:21:57,410 --> 00:22:01,810 business. Your laptop? That is for buying plane tickets or making an Excel 365 00:22:01,810 --> 00:22:05,310 spreadsheet or browsing Civil War maps at the Library of Congress. You know, 366 00:22:05,370 --> 00:22:07,810 business shit, but your cell phone. 367 00:22:08,590 --> 00:22:10,470 That's for your most depraved behaviour. 368 00:22:10,670 --> 00:22:15,130 That's for sexting or a photo of a rash you want to show your doctor. It's for a 369 00:22:15,130 --> 00:22:19,290 phone note that just reads, young Gaddafi handsome, and some safe photos 370 00:22:19,290 --> 00:22:25,110 that emphatically answer that question again and again. Good Lord, those things 371 00:22:25,110 --> 00:22:26,330 need to go to the grave. 372 00:22:27,390 --> 00:22:31,170 Cell site simulators are a mass surveillance tool, and police can get a 373 00:22:31,170 --> 00:22:34,490 lot from them, from who you are calling to what you are texting. 374 00:22:34,730 --> 00:22:35,730 And the thing is... 375 00:22:35,870 --> 00:22:39,050 We don't know how often they do that, because generally, law enforcement keeps 376 00:22:39,050 --> 00:22:43,710 a tight lid on its usage of these devices. In fact, for decades, the FBI's 377 00:22:43,710 --> 00:22:48,590 imposed secrecy obligations on state and local agencies, making them sign NDAs to 378 00:22:48,590 --> 00:22:52,370 prevent disclosure of any information about the devices to the public. 379 00:22:52,940 --> 00:22:56,580 And some police departments have found some pretty creative ways to hide their 380 00:22:56,580 --> 00:23:00,160 usage of these simulators. One in Florida advised officers when using data 381 00:23:00,160 --> 00:23:03,800 obtained with them to just describe it as information from a confidential 382 00:23:03,800 --> 00:23:06,400 source regarding the location of the suspect. 383 00:23:06,760 --> 00:23:11,160 And if you think it right now, well, maybe cops need devices like these for 384 00:23:11,160 --> 00:23:12,139 dire situations. 385 00:23:12,140 --> 00:23:13,140 What if there's a kidnapping? 386 00:23:13,710 --> 00:23:18,150 Or a bomb threat. You should know that is in no way all they get used for. 387 00:23:18,210 --> 00:23:22,870 Because once cops get a new toy, they tend to find lots of excuses to use it. 388 00:23:23,130 --> 00:23:26,270 In at least one instance, Stingray Tech was used to try and track down someone 389 00:23:26,270 --> 00:23:31,770 who stole 15 chicken wings and three sub sandwiches. Look, if you do that, and 390 00:23:31,770 --> 00:23:35,750 you get away so effectively, police have to use a high-tech cell site simulator 391 00:23:35,750 --> 00:23:39,230 to find you. I think you've technically earned those fucking wings. 392 00:23:40,250 --> 00:23:42,250 And look, I know... 393 00:23:42,560 --> 00:23:46,060 I've already thrown a lot of programmes at you tonight, but it's important to 394 00:23:46,060 --> 00:23:48,220 remember that they don't necessarily work in isolation. 395 00:23:48,620 --> 00:23:53,500 They can all feed into real-time crime centres like the ones you saw earlier. 396 00:23:53,580 --> 00:23:57,680 And some departments can then use all the data fed into them to engage in our 397 00:23:57,680 --> 00:24:01,880 final and maybe dumbest use of this tech. It's called predictive policing. 398 00:24:02,330 --> 00:24:07,210 basically using all that data to figure out which areas or individuals might be 399 00:24:07,210 --> 00:24:11,610 likely sources of crime. Think Minority Report, but instead of three pale 400 00:24:11,610 --> 00:24:15,710 orphans hanging out in goo, it's a bunch of bland-looking computers. 401 00:24:16,230 --> 00:24:19,670 Santa Cruz was one of the first big cities to launch predictive policing, 402 00:24:19,790 --> 00:24:23,730 back in 2011, after developing it with the help of a local university, and it 403 00:24:23,730 --> 00:24:25,950 was promoted at the time like this. 404 00:24:26,480 --> 00:24:29,820 Assistant professor of mathematics at the University of Santa Clara compares 405 00:24:29,820 --> 00:24:33,360 this kind of repetitive crime to earthquakes. The initial crime is the 406 00:24:33,360 --> 00:24:34,360 first tremor. 407 00:24:34,520 --> 00:24:36,760 Subsequent crimes follow, like aftershocks. 408 00:24:36,980 --> 00:24:41,340 What you might think of as after crimes, crimes triggered by an initial event. 409 00:24:41,860 --> 00:24:47,060 And what we can do with this model is create maps, maps of when and where 410 00:24:47,060 --> 00:24:48,540 police should direct their efforts. 411 00:24:48,780 --> 00:24:52,840 We put that into the software program. It produces results in a very simple, 412 00:24:52,940 --> 00:24:56,500 easy-to-use Google Map format that we can then provide to the officers to tell 413 00:24:56,500 --> 00:24:58,500 them when and where to be on any given day. 414 00:24:58,760 --> 00:25:01,980 Okay, so first, before you say anything, I know we all see it. 415 00:25:03,690 --> 00:25:06,090 No need to dwell on it. He is pure sex. 416 00:25:06,310 --> 00:25:07,310 Everyone agrees. 417 00:25:07,950 --> 00:25:08,990 End of story. 418 00:25:09,310 --> 00:25:10,430 Let it all out. 419 00:25:11,470 --> 00:25:15,450 There was a lot of hype around what Santa Cruz did at the time. Time 420 00:25:15,450 --> 00:25:18,710 magazine even called its predictive policing one of the 50 best new 421 00:25:18,710 --> 00:25:19,930 inventions of 2011. 422 00:25:20,170 --> 00:25:23,010 Along with, and this is true, the Boeing 787. 423 00:25:23,690 --> 00:25:27,050 I guess it's true what they say. When you're at the top, there's simply no 424 00:25:27,050 --> 00:25:28,750 place to go but up in flames. 425 00:25:29,710 --> 00:25:33,230 And since then, other cities have rolled it out, including L.A., Atlanta, 426 00:25:33,570 --> 00:25:37,430 Philadelphia, Chicago, and St. Louis. And some police departments have applied 427 00:25:37,430 --> 00:25:40,810 predictive policing with the exact opposite of a light touch. 428 00:25:41,070 --> 00:25:44,810 In Pasco County, Florida, the Sheriff's Department used it to compile a list of 429 00:25:44,810 --> 00:25:48,110 top five offenders and other suspects, many of them teenagers. 430 00:25:48,990 --> 00:25:52,890 based on arrest histories, unspecified intelligence, and arbitrary decisions by 431 00:25:52,890 --> 00:25:53,890 police analysts. 432 00:25:53,970 --> 00:25:57,610 Cops would then constantly visit and question those offenders about their 433 00:25:57,610 --> 00:26:01,370 activities, filing reports with details like, of one kid on their list, he has 434 00:26:01,370 --> 00:26:05,370 cut his hair, which is now short. He advised after the summer break, he'll be 435 00:26:05,370 --> 00:26:06,430 going to ninth grade. 436 00:26:06,710 --> 00:26:10,030 And he claims not to be associating with any of his old friends. And that is some 437 00:26:10,030 --> 00:26:12,310 crackerjack police work right there, buddy. 438 00:26:12,810 --> 00:26:16,510 This just in, local teen trying out new vibe this school year. 439 00:26:17,360 --> 00:26:19,880 And see just how ridiculous this got. 440 00:26:20,100 --> 00:26:25,200 Take the case of a kid called Rio, a 15-year-old boy who'd had one arrest for 441 00:26:25,200 --> 00:26:28,200 stealing motorized bicycles with a friend. He'd been placed on probation 442 00:26:28,200 --> 00:26:31,380 and had a probation officer checking up on him. But a year after he was 443 00:26:31,380 --> 00:26:35,440 sentenced, the computer inexplicably placed him on that top five list. 444 00:26:35,640 --> 00:26:38,760 And suddenly the police were constantly turning up to his house. 445 00:26:38,980 --> 00:26:42,380 The Tampa Bay Times actually pulled body camera footage of those interactions and 446 00:26:42,380 --> 00:26:43,880 it is just relentless. 447 00:26:44,750 --> 00:26:46,270 Well, I'm on the tough side. I only have one charge. 448 00:26:46,670 --> 00:26:49,970 It's not about your charge. It's about your... It goes deeper than that. It's 449 00:26:49,970 --> 00:26:52,850 about your network who you associate with and our probation. 450 00:26:53,290 --> 00:26:56,430 Okay, I don't have one charge. You have a lot of involvement in the history of 451 00:26:56,430 --> 00:26:59,570 people that commit crimes. Well, I'll give it the good old knowledge knockers 452 00:26:59,570 --> 00:27:01,430 when we have a chance to, like, sleep in here or some shit. 453 00:27:08,550 --> 00:27:09,550 Sheriff's office. 454 00:27:09,770 --> 00:27:10,569 You need wheel? 455 00:27:10,570 --> 00:27:11,950 Yep. She's nice, I promise. 456 00:27:12,290 --> 00:27:12,999 Hey, bro. 457 00:27:13,000 --> 00:27:14,000 Just come and say hi to Rio. 458 00:27:14,100 --> 00:27:16,360 Is he home? No, he's with his mom. 459 00:27:17,200 --> 00:27:18,200 You need Rio? 460 00:27:18,300 --> 00:27:20,580 Yeah. Officer wanted to talk to you, Rio. 461 00:27:21,060 --> 00:27:23,460 We're just here to say hi to Rio. Hey, Rio, what's going on, buddy? 462 00:27:23,680 --> 00:27:24,720 Might have a chit-chat for a couple minutes. 463 00:27:24,980 --> 00:27:25,980 Happy New Year. 464 00:27:26,920 --> 00:27:29,200 2020. Yeah, happy 2020. 465 00:27:30,180 --> 00:27:31,800 It's going to be a great year. 466 00:27:33,160 --> 00:27:36,300 But wait, because it gets even dumber. Another time the cops showed up and 467 00:27:36,300 --> 00:27:39,480 demanded to see Rio, and when his sister said he wasn't home because he was with 468 00:27:39,480 --> 00:27:40,620 his mom at her work. 469 00:27:41,040 --> 00:27:44,340 Just watch as one deputy tried to bully his way into the house anyway. 470 00:27:45,140 --> 00:27:48,140 So, you can let us walk through right now and make sure he's not here and in 471 00:27:48,140 --> 00:27:51,460 compliance with his probation, or I can throw both of you guys a citation for 472 00:27:51,460 --> 00:27:53,420 not having numbers on the house. What do you want to do? What does that even 473 00:27:53,420 --> 00:27:57,500 mean? You don't have an address on either the mailbox or this house. Is 474 00:27:57,500 --> 00:28:00,180 that a black mailbox? Yes, we do. We have our address on our mailbox right 475 00:28:00,180 --> 00:28:01,640 now. On the other side. 476 00:28:02,080 --> 00:28:03,260 That is pathetic. 477 00:28:04,700 --> 00:28:08,490 Usually, when you hear the word cop... and blackmail you think of high-stakes 478 00:28:08,490 --> 00:28:12,670 situations like infiltrating drug rings or corrupt gambling schemes not let me 479 00:28:12,670 --> 00:28:18,690 see your teen or I'll find your mailbox to hell and look obviously cops can be 480 00:28:18,690 --> 00:28:21,910 assholes no matter what but it definitely doesn't help to have a 481 00:28:21,910 --> 00:28:25,910 computer program telling them you should absolutely go be an asshole to this 482 00:28:25,910 --> 00:28:29,330 particular person because we think they're a criminal just waiting to 483 00:28:29,330 --> 00:28:32,710 happen And it's worth pointing out that a lot of the technologies you've seen 484 00:28:32,710 --> 00:28:36,330 tonight, like ShotSpotter and license plate readers, are disproportionately 485 00:28:36,330 --> 00:28:41,370 used in communities of color. And cameras are often used in tandem with 486 00:28:41,370 --> 00:28:45,090 facial recognition software, which, as we have discussed before, tends to 487 00:28:45,090 --> 00:28:49,170 misidentify suspects far more often based on race. So there is already 488 00:28:49,170 --> 00:28:52,430 racial bias built into many of these technologies. 489 00:28:53,000 --> 00:28:56,560 And when you start feeding them into predictive policing, that only gets 490 00:28:56,560 --> 00:29:00,400 compounded. And it frankly says something. There's a place that started 491 00:29:00,400 --> 00:29:04,840 predictive policing. Santa Cruz actually backed away from it a few years ago for 492 00:29:04,840 --> 00:29:07,980 exactly those reasons, as the police chief there explained. 493 00:29:08,420 --> 00:29:10,940 The people who created it weren't inherently racist. 494 00:29:11,520 --> 00:29:17,200 But the effect of it can be racist, and that's what we were concerned about. 495 00:29:17,380 --> 00:29:21,020 Because if you're putting police officers in a location... 496 00:29:21,320 --> 00:29:26,480 where they're likely to engage people in a negative way, then that becomes the 497 00:29:26,480 --> 00:29:27,720 problem. Right. 498 00:29:28,200 --> 00:29:31,960 And I know he's being very careful there, but luckily I can be a bit more 499 00:29:31,960 --> 00:29:36,020 blunt. The people who created predictive policing that incorporated racist police 500 00:29:36,020 --> 00:29:40,100 practices and data were probably inherently racist. A lot of people are, 501 00:29:40,160 --> 00:29:41,700 either knowingly or not. 502 00:29:42,220 --> 00:29:45,580 And the effect is definitely racist. It's just one of many uncomfortable 503 00:29:45,580 --> 00:29:49,100 truths we should probably all be more upfront about, along with death comes 504 00:29:49,100 --> 00:29:52,960 for all of us, people lie, and unfortunately, the goal of most dating 505 00:29:52,960 --> 00:29:56,380 reality shows isn't to find love, it's to get enough Instagram followers so 506 00:29:56,380 --> 00:29:59,060 that you can get a couple of brand deals and maybe one day start a skincare 507 00:29:59,060 --> 00:30:01,740 company. It's just a regrettable fact. 508 00:30:02,640 --> 00:30:07,400 And those who push all these tools will insist that the technology isn't the 509 00:30:07,400 --> 00:30:09,520 problem here, it's how it gets used. 510 00:30:10,140 --> 00:30:14,000 Flock, which makes many of those ALPRs I showed you earlier, has been branching 511 00:30:14,000 --> 00:30:18,300 out into selling cameras and real-time crime centres to local departments. And 512 00:30:18,300 --> 00:30:21,940 here is how a segment on one of them dealt with citizens' concerns. 513 00:30:22,590 --> 00:30:26,510 Those eyes in the sky and on the roads raise concerns over privacy. 514 00:30:26,850 --> 00:30:31,330 The ACLU has raised concerns with Flock's surveillance network, but Flock 515 00:30:31,330 --> 00:30:35,450 says it's all about how you use it. As long as departments hire ethical people, 516 00:30:35,610 --> 00:30:40,430 write sound policy and have oversight on those policies, then you can start to 517 00:30:40,430 --> 00:30:42,070 ensure that this is all used ethically. 518 00:30:42,310 --> 00:30:47,590 Okay, first, enough with the beard, we get it. But second, oh, it's that easy, 519 00:30:47,650 --> 00:30:48,299 is it? 520 00:30:48,300 --> 00:30:52,460 Just hire ethical people, write sound policy, and have oversight, and it will 521 00:30:52,460 --> 00:30:56,920 all be fine. My brother in Christ, have you, and this is a technical term, 522 00:30:57,060 --> 00:30:58,600 looked around recently? 523 00:30:59,500 --> 00:31:04,640 Because as nice as that sounds, the fact is, departments don't necessarily do any 524 00:31:04,640 --> 00:31:05,640 of those things. 525 00:31:05,760 --> 00:31:09,040 There have now been many, many stories from around the country of police 526 00:31:09,040 --> 00:31:12,840 officers accused of using ALPR databases to stalk and harass women. 527 00:31:13,120 --> 00:31:14,940 As for oversight, well, flock... 528 00:31:15,210 --> 00:31:18,870 claims that every search request is logged for accountability purposes. When 529 00:31:18,870 --> 00:31:22,190 this man in Georgia tried to find out who'd accessed the cameras near his 530 00:31:22,190 --> 00:31:26,810 home, his city told him it would cost him half a million dollars to fulfil his 531 00:31:26,810 --> 00:31:28,570 request, which is clearly crazy. 532 00:31:29,070 --> 00:31:32,990 Now, they did give him a much more limited data set, but interestingly, he 533 00:31:32,990 --> 00:31:37,810 still found enough troubling new information in that to then take it to a 534 00:31:37,810 --> 00:31:38,810 city council meeting. 535 00:31:39,420 --> 00:31:43,980 Hunyar went to city council with the limited flock audit records Dunwoody 536 00:31:43,980 --> 00:31:47,540 gave him. Nobody from flock safety is accessing your monitor and your footage. 537 00:31:47,720 --> 00:31:51,800 Once again, I have evidence of flock employees looking at parks, schools, 538 00:31:52,000 --> 00:31:56,780 playgrounds. The audit logs also showed flock executives watching private 539 00:31:56,780 --> 00:32:01,180 cameras inside the city's Jewish community center, which the mayor 540 00:32:01,180 --> 00:32:04,480 confirmed. Members of the flock sales team. 541 00:32:05,530 --> 00:32:08,650 We're using it as a demonstration. 542 00:32:09,310 --> 00:32:14,110 OK, hold on, hold on, because there is just a cascading set of yikes there. 543 00:32:14,570 --> 00:32:17,690 First, you get the news that it's not just cops and security guards. Flock 544 00:32:17,690 --> 00:32:21,350 employees are watching these cameras too. Then you get to parks, schools, 545 00:32:21,570 --> 00:32:25,270 playgrounds, and a strolling list of cameras with labels like gymnastics and 546 00:32:25,270 --> 00:32:26,610 gymnastics side view. 547 00:32:27,010 --> 00:32:30,610 Then you learn they're at the Jewish community centre. And finally, that it 548 00:32:30,610 --> 00:32:31,990 was for a sales demonstration. 549 00:32:32,370 --> 00:32:34,650 What was even the pitch there? 550 00:32:35,290 --> 00:32:38,510 Ever wonder what your Jewish neighbors were up to but didn't feel like going 551 00:32:38,510 --> 00:32:42,450 over there to ask? Ever wonder what they look like doing yoga? Well, now you 552 00:32:42,450 --> 00:32:44,690 don't have to. Why knock when you can flock? 553 00:32:46,470 --> 00:32:51,590 And when a reporter asked a flock spokesperson about that, it didn't go 554 00:32:51,590 --> 00:32:54,930 great. Why didn't flock find those vulnerabilities? 555 00:32:55,550 --> 00:33:01,510 We actually can't talk about the JCPOA by name. 556 00:33:04,160 --> 00:33:06,280 Why can't you talk about the JCC? 557 00:33:07,800 --> 00:33:14,580 A Flock PR person stopped our interview twice when we tried to ask about Flock 558 00:33:14,580 --> 00:33:17,820 employees viewing cameras inside the Jewish Community Center. 559 00:33:18,120 --> 00:33:21,000 Did the people in those videos give permission to be part of a demo? 560 00:33:27,100 --> 00:33:30,200 Partnership? I have to ask the question however you guys want to answer it. And 561 00:33:30,200 --> 00:33:32,920 if you want to say you can't answer it, you can't answer it. That's fine. But I 562 00:33:32,920 --> 00:33:33,920 have to ask the question. 563 00:33:34,120 --> 00:33:35,760 I can't. It's not a PR video. 564 00:33:36,020 --> 00:33:37,540 This isn't like a promotional video. 565 00:33:38,120 --> 00:33:41,740 I think it's pretty clear we're not. It's not a PR video. We're good, though. 566 00:33:42,060 --> 00:33:43,060 Yeah. 567 00:33:43,160 --> 00:33:45,960 I'm not sure you're quite as good as you think you are there. 568 00:33:46,680 --> 00:33:50,060 And I know it is hard for you to deal with cameras that you don't control, but 569 00:33:50,060 --> 00:33:54,060 what did you think that news crew were going to do there? Leave that exchange 570 00:33:54,060 --> 00:33:59,180 out? News stations fucking love it when someone tries to stop an interview. All 571 00:33:59,180 --> 00:34:02,400 you've really done there is managed to look suspicious and to get them to break 572 00:34:02,400 --> 00:34:03,700 out the good subtitles. 573 00:34:05,380 --> 00:34:10,380 The fact is, it currently takes far too much pressure to expose what systems 574 00:34:10,380 --> 00:34:12,560 cities are using and... 575 00:34:12,989 --> 00:34:16,110 how they are using them. In fact, remember how I mentioned that Rialto, 576 00:34:16,150 --> 00:34:20,510 California requires new businesses to hook their security cameras up to fuses? 577 00:34:20,650 --> 00:34:25,050 Well, three years ago, we filed a narrow public records request with their police 578 00:34:25,050 --> 00:34:28,770 department asking for emails in which fuses was discussed. They told us they 579 00:34:28,770 --> 00:34:31,370 didn't have any, which seemed implausible. 580 00:34:31,920 --> 00:34:35,940 So we filed a much broader request, and over the next two years, they sent us 28 581 00:34:35,940 --> 00:34:40,199 pages, which still didn't seem like all the material they probably had. 582 00:34:40,400 --> 00:34:45,199 So last February, we said, fuck it, send us an export of your whole log database 583 00:34:45,199 --> 00:34:49,300 for users, showing us every time your officers peeked at a privately owned 584 00:34:49,300 --> 00:34:52,219 camera. And we asked for it as a searchable digital file. 585 00:34:52,810 --> 00:34:54,210 as the law requires. 586 00:34:54,510 --> 00:34:59,690 But instead, what they did was send us a 30,413-page PDF. 587 00:35:00,070 --> 00:35:03,890 To give you a sense of just how massive that is, if you printed it out, it is 588 00:35:03,890 --> 00:35:09,830 all of this shit right here. Which was clearly pretty irritating, because it's 589 00:35:09,830 --> 00:35:13,990 a huge amount of information that is impossible to look through quickly. Now, 590 00:35:14,030 --> 00:35:18,170 thankfully, we managed to convert it into a searchable file, and in doing so, 591 00:35:18,330 --> 00:35:19,510 we found something. 592 00:35:20,120 --> 00:35:23,120 that it does feel the people of Rialto should probably know about. 593 00:35:23,360 --> 00:35:28,300 For instance, this is just all the times police there access cameras at fast food 594 00:35:28,300 --> 00:35:32,040 places. And you should know, some of those cameras are inside the restaurant 595 00:35:32,040 --> 00:35:36,100 in areas only employees can access. For instance, it seems they can check in on 596 00:35:36,100 --> 00:35:39,400 the grill at the local Wienerschnitzel any time they want. 597 00:35:39,820 --> 00:35:41,820 And if you work at the Chick-fil-A there... 598 00:35:42,030 --> 00:35:46,410 Just know that on one Tuesday afternoon, Rialto had five of your interior cameras 599 00:35:46,410 --> 00:35:50,330 open for two hours straight. The front counter, the drive-thru register, the 600 00:35:50,330 --> 00:35:54,790 multi-purpose room, the manager station, and the office. Which feels a little 601 00:35:54,790 --> 00:35:58,770 weird to me, as does the fact that they access cameras at the Rialto Days Inn 602 00:35:58,770 --> 00:36:03,990 for hundreds of hours, including the one facing the pool. And come on, getting 603 00:36:03,990 --> 00:36:08,250 secretly watched in your swimsuit is not supposed to be one of the perks of 604 00:36:08,250 --> 00:36:09,350 staying at a Days Inn. 605 00:36:10,320 --> 00:36:15,320 You are supposed to get a room that is fine, a bed that will do, and a front 606 00:36:15,320 --> 00:36:20,300 desk that occasionally has an employee behind it. That is the days in promise. 607 00:36:21,000 --> 00:36:25,480 And I should say, the Rialto PD in six, some of those hit because they were 608 00:36:25,480 --> 00:36:30,160 watching a whole area and scooping up all the cameras, or that they'd left a 609 00:36:30,160 --> 00:36:34,420 set of cameras on in the background at their office. But that is just not as 610 00:36:34,420 --> 00:36:37,080 reassuring as I think they want it to sound. 611 00:36:37,530 --> 00:36:42,050 Look, it sure seems to me like these surveillance tools have much bigger 612 00:36:42,050 --> 00:36:45,950 flaws than the people both selling and using them are comfortable admitting. 613 00:36:46,090 --> 00:36:49,810 Because time and again, the pattern when they get rolled out is they get deployed 614 00:36:49,810 --> 00:36:54,210 in secret and then publicly presented in the most positive light and only much 615 00:36:54,210 --> 00:36:58,650 later do we start to fully understand the damage they can do. Basically, the 616 00:36:58,650 --> 00:37:01,470 public conversation comes last, not first. 617 00:37:02,080 --> 00:37:05,200 And the good news is, due in part to the vast overreach of the current 618 00:37:05,200 --> 00:37:08,800 administration, we are now finally starting to have those conversations. 619 00:37:09,080 --> 00:37:13,520 Around the country, people are showing up to demand their cities and towns end 620 00:37:13,520 --> 00:37:17,720 contracts with companies like Flock, including a man in Seattle who did so 621 00:37:17,720 --> 00:37:19,820 while dressed as an ALPR. 622 00:37:20,240 --> 00:37:25,560 And while I admire his commitment to the cause, he does look more like what would 623 00:37:25,560 --> 00:37:28,500 happen if a Pixar dad fucks the Pixar lamp. Because... 624 00:37:29,020 --> 00:37:31,540 I think we'd all agree this is what would happen then. 625 00:37:32,340 --> 00:37:36,980 But it is worth remembering, flock cameras are just one part of a vast 626 00:37:36,980 --> 00:37:41,140 ecosystem here, and even if your town gets rid of them, cops might still be 627 00:37:41,140 --> 00:37:44,780 looking at cameras in private businesses, or using thing rays, or 628 00:37:44,780 --> 00:37:47,360 employing any of the other technologies you've seen tonight. 629 00:37:47,620 --> 00:37:51,140 If you now want to know what's being used in your town, you can check out 630 00:37:51,140 --> 00:37:54,680 resources like the EFF's Atlas of Surveillance, which catalogues... 631 00:37:54,940 --> 00:37:58,540 each of the technologies used in your area. And I'll warn you, the answer 632 00:37:58,540 --> 00:38:00,360 probably isn't going to make you happy. 633 00:38:00,700 --> 00:38:04,640 Now, as for what to do about all this, experts say that to the extent we use 634 00:38:04,640 --> 00:38:07,000 any of these technologies at all... 635 00:38:07,340 --> 00:38:10,640 We at the very least need to make sure that they are thoroughly vetted and 636 00:38:10,640 --> 00:38:15,120 debated before installation and mandate audits focused on civil rights, civil 637 00:38:15,120 --> 00:38:18,920 liberties, privacy and racial justice risks to be conducted both before and 638 00:38:18,920 --> 00:38:21,000 after a technology is adopted. 639 00:38:21,340 --> 00:38:24,660 And that really doesn't seem like too much to ask. 640 00:38:24,900 --> 00:38:28,920 Because the very fact that we don't already currently have all those 641 00:38:28,920 --> 00:38:32,400 requirements in place is... What is the best phrase for me to use here? 642 00:38:32,640 --> 00:38:33,640 That's insane. 643 00:38:34,020 --> 00:38:35,020 That's crazy. 644 00:38:35,400 --> 00:38:37,390 Yeah. It really is. 645 00:38:38,070 --> 00:38:40,890 That's our show. Thank you so much for watching. We'll see you next week. Good 646 00:38:40,890 --> 00:38:41,890 night.